January 8, 2016 — Cyber-warfare[1] is human-warfare and SOF must play a role. Even in terms of unclear interaction, such as between the US and China, investing SOF expertise into cyber-organizations helps to fill the gaps of American practice caused by elemental differences in military cultures. Whereas, principled Clausewitzian and Jominian theories inspire idealistic US strategies, China’s Sun Tzu inspired stratagems are as unpredictable and deceptive as human nature itself. Defensively oriented, US military culture favors warfare in terms of absolutes and wrestles with cyber-warfare’s ambiguity as a successful strategic deterrent. Conversely, Chinese military culture embraces and promotes ambiguity and brandishes cyber-warfare as a strategic compellent. While US cyber-warfare practice is objective and technically driven, China’s more subjective “cyber-shi”[2] application is coercive and psychologically driven. Ready to help close cyber-warfare’s clear cultural gap, SOF are experts at exploiting the psychological, cultural, and societal factors that drive human behavior and are masters in unconventional warfare. SOF are purpose-built to provide unique expertise on human nature in conflict and are perfectly-suited to advance US cyber-practice better-adapted to counter adversaries in the “gray zone.”[3] By investing SOF experts into cyber-organizations, the Department of Defense (DoD) generates more asymmetric cyber-warfare options and strengthens the nation by fusing the best of competing historic approaches, in this most modern form of human-warfare. MORE
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January 4, 2016 — Convergence is the foundry for new possibilities. Convergence of Cyberspace Operations (CO) and Electronic Warfare (EW) effects creates combined effects to achieve both offensive and defensive overmatch. Recently the US Air Force revealed the use of a modified EC-130 Compass Call aircraft to remotely attack enemy networks.1 The 24th Air Force commander, Major General Burke “Ed” Wilson, spoke of this capability enabling the ability to “touch a network that in most cases might be closed.”2 While the need for convergence of cyberspace operations and electronic warfare is recognized within the Department of Defense (DoD), differences between how these two capabilities are trained, resourced, organized and employed combined with the significant functional level differences between the two have hindered efforts to converge their capabilities. A concerted effort must be undertaken at the both the Joint and Service levels to closely integrate CO with EW effects to achieve combined effects, enabling comprehensive shaping of the operational environment. The first step in this effort is for CO and EW professionals to commit themselves to professional self-development in their counterparts’ field. MORE
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December 17, 2015 — The Army has identified a need to more formally develop “cyber planners” who effectively plan and integrate cyberspace operations within Army and joint operations at all levels of command. The establishment of career field 17 (Cyber) and its alignment with FA 29 (EW) have created conditions to initiate such a program, assess its effectiveness over officer careers, and make continual adjustment as needed. Institutional ownership (Cyber School) of the program will ensure the proven build-assess-build approach to developing cyber planners, but the key is to begin now with general consensus. We summarize the essential context for cyber planning based on an informal survey of subject matter experts across the Army and propose a three-tiered model yielding cyberspace planning expertise at tactical, operational, and strategic levels of command. MORE
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December 14, 2015 — I. MotivationAs captured in numerous strategic policy documents and speeches, the need to develop a military cyber profession (MCP) or workforce in America is significant.[1],[2],[3],[4],[5],[6] Unfortunately for the United States military, such development has been hampered by a lack of durable and widely accepted definitions of the MCP, which MORE
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December 10, 2015 — Joint force commanders exercise mission command across all domains to include land, air, maritime, space, and cyberspace. According to joint doctrine, mission command involves the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution,[1] and this demands that leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative to accomplish missions.[2] However, in the case of military operations in cyberspace, there are aspects of mission command that are not yet fully developed for the joint force.[3] For instance, the emphasis on delegation and decentralization are not always appropriate for situations involving the employment of national level cyberspace capabilities designed to create effects in support of unified action.[4] Army forces are currently incorporating cyberspace as an “operational domain,”[5] and commanders understand how this effort has direct implications for their exercise of mission command in support of unified land operations.[6] In the absence of an operational example, past and current conditions on cyberspace integration will be discussed along with the mission command principle of creating shared understanding. MORE
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November 19, 2015 — Every year, developed and developing countries increasingly rely on cyberspace infrastructure for economic activity and governance. Specifically, mobile wireless networks are an indispensable component of the cyberspace landscape. This paper explores the necessity of mobile wireless networks during crisis. Mobile networks have proven essential for relief efforts in the aftermath of disasters and during conflicts. The US military trains to respond to such crisis scenarios, but current US cyberspace doctrine primarily focuses on the cybersecurity of its own military cyberspace infrastructure. This mindset does not adequately addresses the imperatives for assisting civil authorities or host nations restore/protect cyber capabilities. To be successful in future contingencies, the US military must integrate mobile network cybersecurity into its operations planning. Even in the poorest communities, mobile wireless networks are becoming fundamental to the governance, economic growth, and social fabric. The US military must train and deploy teams that can rapidly restore and secure these mobile networks. MORE
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November 18, 2015 — In 2013, The Decade of War Working Group released a “Decade of War: Enduring Lessons from a Decade of Operations.” The document captured the critical lessons from a decade of combat experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Absent from this document were insights regarding the employment of US cyber capabilities. This omission should not imply that after a decade of war, the United States cannot delineate key insights into military cyber operations. The Decade of War publication did extensively examine the impacts of General Purpose Force (GPF) – Special Operations Force (SOF) integration. This examination provides a cornerstone for necessary future synergies between Cyber and GPF in order to achieve unity of effort, effective intelligence defensive cyber operations, and optimization of offensive cyber effects. Following a GPF – SOF model, the US military should view cyber forces as a member of the combined arms team, establish fusion cells at the tactical level of war, and imbed cyber personnel as liaisons in tactical organizations to develop a true common operating picture and achieve unity of effort. MORE
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November 17, 2015 — The past few weeks have seen a remarkable shift in Syria. Russian fighter jets are bombing opponents of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.[1] At least a few thousand Russian soldiers are now on Syrian soil.[2] And the Obama administration is scrambling to re-calibrate its policy positions toward Syria in light of these developments. Yet there is good reason to suspect that Russian plans for Syria go beyond the mere presence of conventional military forces. For the United States to begin managing the Russian presence in Syria effectively, it will soon have to come to terms with the prospect of Russian cyber attacks in Syria, as well. MORE
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November 16, 2015 — The Department of Defense (DoD), and the US Army, are rapidly expanding the positions and personnel to operate in the cyberspace domain, one of the five independent warfighting domains [1]. Recognizing the importance of integrating cyber operations throughout the Army led to the recent creation of a new cyber branch, the first new branch in decades. Filling these new positions with the best qualified personnel is not an easy task.
The DoD Cyberspace Workforce Strategy of 2013 lays outs requirements to assess aptitude and qualifications, noting “not all successful cyberspace personnel will have a Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM) background. Rather, a broad range of experiences can lead to a qualified cyberspace employee.” The Strategy directs developing aptitude assessment methods to identify individuals’ thinking and problem-solving abilities as tools for recruitment. Further, it directs DoD to evaluate the “availability or development” of assessment tools to identify military candidates for cyberspace positions [2].
This paper begins with a discussion of the issues surrounding aptitude assessment and continues by identifying several existing test instruments. It then identifies testing results and finishes with several recommendations for talent identification.
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November 6, 2015 —
The stated purpose of the Department of Defense (DoD) Law of War Manual is “to provide information on the law of war to DoD personnel responsible for implementing the law of war and executing military operations.”[1] Judge advocates are responsible for advising commanders regarding laws applicable to operations, but ultimately commanders are accountable for the consequences of their operations. At over 1,100 pages, the Manual is too detailed to be useful reading for commanders, who must be concerned with every aspect of the mission; the intended audience for the Manual is judge advocates. If DoD intended for the Manual to help judge advocates advise commanders regarding operations in cyberspace, however, it might have used more of the pages providing detailed discussions of realistic cyber issues.
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