July 27, 2020 — Artificial intelligence (AI) is a set of algorithmic tools and technologies that enable machines to perform tasks that normally require human intelligence—such as perceiving the world, learning from experience, reasoning through information, representing knowledge, acting, and adapting.[1] Given the multitude of rapid technological advancements in AI, computing, big data analytics and autonomy, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasized the importance of leveraging the “very technologies that ensure we will be able to fight and win the wars of the future.” The 2018 NDS flags ways to modernize key capabilities in “address[ing] the scope and pace of our competitors’ and adversaries’ ambitions and capabilities,” and the need to “invest broadly in military application of autonomy, AI, and machine learning, including rapid application of commercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military advantages.” MORE
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July 27, 2020 — Storyweapons are adversarial narratives that use algorithms, automation, codespaces, and data to hijack decision-making, and the stories of who we are, what we believe and why it matters. They leverage vulnerabilities and weaknesses against people and populations; they subvert freewill to bend actions to self-sabotage. Storyweapons exploit attack vectors across our new mixed reality of code and cognition, and they move the frontlines into the minds and software connected to any strategic objective. Defending the US against storyweapons requires a reconsideration of battlefields, operational models, and threat actors. MORE
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July 27, 2020 — None there at the time could forget the vicious cyberattack on Venezuela’s power systems in March 2019. Four days of chaos ensued. Stores and restaurants closed. Card payments systems were down, with customers asked to pay in dollars. Disrupted public transportation left many unable to get to work. Looting ensued. Seventeen people died in hospitals for lack of electricity. MORE
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July 27, 2020 — The doctrinal history of information operations, cyber operations, and psychological operations within DoD is tangled and confused. Moreover, those military specialties rank lower in the DoD pecking order, and those with such specialties are accorded less respect than those specializing in traditional combat arts. These two realities have led to inconsistent usage of these and related terms within DoD and the larger national security community in government as well as in public discourse and, arguably, a misallocation of resources given the importance of the information environment in military operations. MORE
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July 27, 2020 — The information environment (IE) and operations in and through the IE are currently a particular point of emphasis within the Department of Defense (DoD). Information is the newest joint function (joining command and control, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment). The Marine Corps has followed suit and made information a warfighting function, and the Army is considering a similar move. 2016 saw the first DoD Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment, and 2017 saw the development of the Joint Concept for Operating in the Information Environment, signed and released (and the subject of a capabilities-based assessment) in 2018. Senior leaders across the department have repeatedly expounded on the importance of the IE for military operations and declared it a priority. MORE
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July 27, 2020 — For many years now, Russia has defined and even expanded its concept of “information weapons (IWes).”[1] At one point, Russia attempted to get the concept introduced into United Nations resolutions, which at the time helped to guarantee Russian information and national security. This occurred in the 1990s when Russia was at its weakest and unable to compete with other nations in information warfare capabilities. MORE
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March 23, 2020 — Welcome to the Spring edition of The Cyber Defense Review (CDR), and the exciting publication of the CyCon U.S. 2019 conference papers. This edition of the CDR will feature 6 policy and 5 technical papers that dramatically provide texture and insight into the complicated Defending Forward strategy. The 11 papers were presented on November 18-20, at the Crystal Gateway Marriott in Alexandria, VA. The CyCon U.S. conference is the premier forum on cyber conflict. It is a collaborative effort between the Army Cyber Institute (ACI) at West Point and the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence and complements the CyCon Conference held every spring in Estonia. MORE
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March 23, 2020 — The persistent engagement strategy in cyberspace requires partnership between the public and private sectors. This whole-of-society approach is greatly needed, as cyber threats are holistic. Partnership can yield a number of good outcomes that all parties seek to achieve. However, having truly productive partnership requires a significant amount of time and effort. There are different partnership methods that ask for different amount of time, effort, and resources. Hence, it is crucial to have a better understanding of the requirements of each partnership method. To this end, this article proposes a framework that incorporates various partnership methods with aims to achieve various goals. It demonstrates that this framework can provide guidance for selecting an appropriate partnership method based on specific conditions, needs, and requirements. MORE
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March 23, 2020 — Examining the ‘defending forward’ concept and the intersection between DoD and the private sector speaks to aligning instruments of national power to set the stage for the consolidation of Internet connectivity and an expansion of that capability. Both outcomes feed a new understanding of what a professional military does in the cyber age to safeguard a civilian interface that is revamping the norms of government across state boundaries. Implementing an effective cyber strategy necessitates recasting the US military’s cyber operations to support civilian efforts. A dramatic point of departure from the current emphasis, this change in focus will prevent the US military from leading a non-violent conflict at odds with war in the corporal world. Instead, civilians will be charged with winning the fight in the cognitive arena of cyberspace. MORE
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March 23, 2020 — The search for norms has proven to be one of the most frustrating elements of cyberspace operations. Informed consensus holds that there should be norms of international behavior to tame the Wild West of cyberspace. Yet, if norms are defined to exist when a country refrains from operations otherwise in its interest[1] (taking domestic and international politics into account) they do not exist. That is, there are zero such norms that enjoy adherence that matters. In light of such disappointments, this paper mulls a different approach to thinking about norms. Rather than focusing on what responsible governments should not do, it looks at what they actually do as a guide to what activities in cyberspace have effectively been normalized (that is, within de facto norms)—and may remain normalized until the rewards from such activities no longer merit the effort. This argument has three parts. The first part discusses the lack of progress towards norms. The second defines normalization and examines the extent to which the behaviors of specific countries establish what has, in effect, been normalized. The third part focuses on one particular activity—implanting malware into the weapons systems of potential adversaries—as a candidate for normalization. MORE
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