November 14, 2022 — The Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) established the National Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence (NSCAI) to consider the methods and means necessary to advance development of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and other associated technologies to address America’s national security concerns. NSCAI’s final report to the President and Congress identified areas of weakness that the federal government must address to elevate data security as a national security priority. NSCAI recommended the federal government implement a security development lifecycle approach for AI systems, prioritize data privacy and security considerations as part of larger efforts to strengthen foreign investment screening and supply chain intelligence and risk management, and integrate national security considerations into efforts to legislate and regulate data protection and privacy. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — This article aims to identify and clarify a hierarchical construct used by defensive cyberspace planners and operators to aid in mission decomposition, assurance, and terrain mapping. The model enables the visualization of complex relationships and equities between cyberspace assets, resources, and warfighting missions.
At a time when so many Department of Defense mission-essential tasks and functions are cyber enabled, it is more critical now than ever that we strive to model the highly complex cyberspace operational environment in an understandable and useful way. Modeling is a practical means to take logical components of cyberspace, tether them to physical assets, and illuminate how they ultimately support missions. We can then prioritize mission-critical systems and capabilities, organize the defense of those cyberspace elements, and gain confidence we are defending the right things at the right time. While this model is conceptual, it represents a first step toward automating cyberspace terrain mapping that will enable defensive cyber planners and DODIN Cyberspace Forces to respond to the dynamic, man-made terrain that makes up the cyber operational environment. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — In this article, I review how the international cybersecurity norms, agreed to in 2015 and reaffirmed in 2021 by the member countries of the United Nations (UN), provide guidance to states on their possession and use of offensive cyber capabilities. This is an important exploration given that UN negotiations have reached a provisional climax, and that more states, ranging from major cyber powers to developing cyber nations, are getting involved with offensive cyber activities. I consider the 11 UN norms and extract the specific guidance they offer both to states that conduct offensive cyber operations and to states who have been attacked by offensive cyber activities. Then, I consider the various types of cyber operations that could affect international peace and security before looking at ways through which governments, international bodies and communities of non-governmental organizations can support observance of the UN norms. Finally, I assert that responsible forms of offensive cyber will not be for all states, and that raising the bar – including through the UN norms – benefits all major cyber powers. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — An increasingly urgent debate rages in many circles about the “Artificial Intelligence (AI) Arms Race” rapidly progressing on a global scale. Among many unanswered questions, one is of particular interest to the United States (US) government: Where does the US stand in this race relative to China? This question is critical because the AI Arms Race “winner” will dominate how AI impacts myriad aspects of human society worldwide. For the US to lead the AI race, it will require a conscious partnership among public, private, and academic sectors, and a strategic alignment with our allies. Our relative position as a world leader, our relative position as an economic leader, and our standing as a moral force for all people’s good and ethical treatment are at risk. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — Until 2020, biological warfare seemed like a remote threat to military operations and national security. Then, in March 2020, the novel SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV2) emerged and forced the world, including the Department of Defense (DoD), to acknowledge the calamitous potential of deadly virus pandemics.
The United States 2018 National Biodefense Strategy (NBS) warns of the need to enhance biological threat responses to prevent such detrimental effects.1 It highlights the natural, isolated outbreaks of Systemic Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Ebola, and Zika viruses as potential agents on which clandestine bioweapon programs or terrorist groups seeking such programs could capitalize. The NBS outlines a plan to prevent, detect, and respond to biological threats, providing defense and deterrence strategies to avert bioweapon use on American civilians or military personnel. A nation with a strong biological defense decreases its population’s vulnerability to pathogens with aggressive exposure mitigation and effective treatment measures, which thereby increase the nation’s resiliency to public health crises. Such defense capabilities change an adversary’s cost-benefit balance so that it avoids initiating a biological attack, providing deterrence from future threats. The success of these response strategies requires cooperation among government, medical, public health personnel, and the general population. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — To fight and win in cyberspace, the United States needs a Cyber Force. During World War II, air power tipped the scale of victory in favor of the allies, as aviation proved to be an indispensable warfighting capability. The creation of the Air Force was predicated on the notion that the effective employment air power is not a matter of choice, but the very condition on which national survival rested. Today, cyber superiority has wider implications for US national security than air superiority had at the close of World War II; however, the federal government is not structured to effectively defend the US national interests. The current division of cyber authorities precludes comprehensive mitigation of cyber-enabled malicious activities. To effectively combat nation-state and non-state actors targeting US and allied interests in cyberspace, the US should establish a Cyber Force modeled on the U.S. Coast Guard with a reserve component modeled on the National Guard. Combining these models would allow for a single force capable of executing military operations, law enforcement activities, and intelligence collection at the direction of the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security, complemented by an expansive reserve component available to both state governors and the federal government. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — This case study builds on previous analyses of Russian information warfare and covers the forms and tactics in simultaneous campaigns in Ukraine and the US between 2014 and 2020, using Daniel P. Bagge’s DOPES methodology to discern and analyze patterns within events data from the two campaigns. Use of DOPES illustrates that Russian information warfare possesses discernible forms and tactics across varying contextual situations and is highly flexible. The forms and tactics align with Russian information warfare (IW) doctrine and the goals of reflexive control. The case study concludes with a discussion of strategic and policy level recommendations to counter the effects of Russian IW. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — In the interconnected era of the Internet, the military must confront the new face of an old threat: narrative conflict. Where states once maintained nearly absolute domestic control of the narratives surrounding their military engagements, social media have created a wide array of perspectives, arguments, and disinformation campaigns that constantly affect both the civilian and military populations. These campaigns encourage the questioning of state objectives and threaten the identity of the individual and the collective ontological identity of the society, making it more difficult for states to maintain momentum and support for their military endeavors. Without that support, military campaigns can collapse, regardless of the skill or preparedness of warfighters. This research explores three topics relevant to the U.S. Army in hopes of helping it better equip itself to succeed in narrative conflicts: the strategic impacts of commander’s decisions on the battlefield, the need to control signals emissions, and the consequences of bulk internet data sales. It then concludes by providing brief policy suggestions for mitigating these issues. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — State-enabled cyber campaigns are achieving cumulative, strategic effects on the United States. A lack of transparency limits offensive cyber capabilities from affecting the cost-benefit decisions of malicious cyber actors. However, recent operations suggest the United States can positively attribute malicious cyber activities, impose significant consequences with offensive cyber force, and translate those actions into deterrence of specific malicious activities using public communication. Persistent, public disclosure is necessary for offensive cyberspace operations to deter malicious cyber activities, nested with US strategic guidance, and achievable based on recent cyberspace operations. Transparent Offensive Cyber Persistence combines persistence with post factum, public disclosure of the justification, targets, and impacts of offensive cyber force, exchanging information for deterrence credibility. This work evaluates its suitability, acceptability, feasibility, and risks. Transparent Offensive Cyber Persistence exploits the relative advantages of offense in cyberspace to impose costs directly on malicious cyber actors, compel targets to defend everywhere, dissuade other actors, set a legitimate narrative of consequences for unacceptable malicious cyber activities, and shape international norms. MORE
|
November 14, 2022 — The consistent development of information and communication technologies poses new ethical challenges for military leaders and policymakers in the fifth domain of warfare—cyberspace. This article engages a relatively new ethical framework known as Just Information Warfare (JIW) to assess one of the highest profile instances of information warfare in recent years—Russian interference in the 2016 US presidential election. First, we define information warfare and describe how concepts from two well-known ethical theories—Just War Theory and Information Ethics—merge to create JIW. Next, we analyze Russian military officers' 2016 election interference efforts and the corresponding US response through a JIW lens. Finally, we offer three key takeaways from our analysis that warrant further thought. MORE
|