December 5, 2023 — Recent cybersecurity events have prompted the federal government to begin inves-tigating strategies to transition to Zero Trust Architectures (ZTA) for federal infor-mation systems. Within federated mission networks, ZTA provides means to mini-mize the potential for unauthorized release and disclosure of information outside bilateral and multilateral agreements. But when federating with mission partners, there are potential risks that may undermine the benefits of Zero Trust. This article explores risks associated with integrating multiple identity models and proposes two potential avenues to investigate mitigation of these risks. MORE
|
December 5, 2023 — In 1984, Glenn H. Snyder wrote an analysis of states’ dilemmas in alliances with this issue at its core that has demonstrably had excellent explanatory and predictive power.1 In the Cold War’s technological strategic context of nuclear and conventional military means, he found that: “In general, entrapment is a more serious concern for the lesser allies than for the superpowers […] because the superpowers have a much greater capacity for taking ini¬tiatives (notably nuclear initiatives).” In NATO, the US controls much of the alliance’s conventional military capabilities and most of its nuclear weapons. Applying Snyder’s analysis, this vests the US with a sufficient level of control over NATO’s crisis management, to minimize the US’ risk of en¬trapment in conflicts. Emergence of cyberspace as a new venue for military operations changes the US strategic environment. MORE
|
December 5, 2023 — In a world of ubiquitous connections, cybersecurity is everyone’s responsibility. Gone are the days when the actions of others had little impact on a person’s day-to-day ac¬tivities. We are now completely digitally interdependent, meaning the actions of one individual can be the vulnerability that allows adversaries to target a soft spot in the United States’ (U.S.) digital infrastructure. We argue a whole-of-society approach to cybersecurity is needed. The involvement of all members of society is required to de¬fend against the scourge of cyber intrusions emanating from Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran. We do not promote individuals or corporations engaging in offensive cyber operations, but instead advocate that the U.S. already has a non-governmental model for citizen involvement in entities like the Civil Air Patrol (CAP), to adopt for cyberspace. We build on Estonia’s Cyber Defense League (CDL) organizational model and the works of others, advocating for establishing a Civil Cyber Defense (CCD) in the U.S. We conclude with specific actions this new entity could take to increase the overall cybersecurity posture of the U.S. and identify potential issues with our CCD concept. MORE
|
December 5, 2023 — Information and cyber action have been important but ancillary components of the Ukraine war since its outbreak on February 24, 2022. We offer a set of observations:
• A form of cyber conflict has emerged in which Russia often attempts to aggres¬sively deny service or purloin information, while Ukraine and its allies often blunt the attacks;
• Communications security for Russian forces from the tactical- to theater-level has frequently failed, often with disastrous consequences, as signals intelligence information has been employed to target military command echelons;
• Unmanned aircraft have come to occupy a critical intelligence and air support function for Ukraine, although Russia is increasingly able to employ drones as well;
• Intelligence support from the West to Ukraine appears highly significant and useful, possibly substantially shaping Ukrainian strategy and tactics;
• The infrastructure and technical expertise of large tech firms such as Google, Microsoft, and SpaceX also helped Ukraine stay abreast of the Russian cyber threats; and
• Propaganda operations by Ukraine have had tremendous reach in Europe and continue to elicit support, while those of Russia have been largely inward-facing and designed to shore up support for the war among the Russian public.
We also consider what cyber tools and effects might be employed as the war continues. MORE
|
December 5, 2023 — The United States risks losing its information advantage over its near-peer compet-itors, specifically China. One reason behind this possibility is that the U.S. lacks a coherent doctrine of information warfare, which has put the U.S. at a disadvantage. Considering the Russian interference in elections of several North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states and allies, including Ukraine, Germany, and the United States, most stunningly in the 2016 presidential election, this article addresses the question: What is to be done? Before delving into possible solutions, the exact nature of the complex problem must be explored. The purpose of this article is to investigate the ways the U.S. could improve in information warfare, specifically against one of its top near-peer competitors, China. First, this article summarizes how China com¬pares with the U.S. concerning information warfare and influence opera¬tions. Second, it delves into some of the definitional chaos in which the U.S. is mired. Thirdly, the article illustrates the doctrinal and data policies of the U.S. Department of Defense. Finally, it concludes with policy recommendations. MORE
|
December 5, 2023 — When I reflect on the changes over the last decade in the cyber domain, there appears to be a common theme: collaboration and interdisciplinary teamwork. Technology continues to evolve rapidly. However, our ability to employ technology and defend cyberspace suc¬cessfully has increasingly required collaboration and teamwork; hence, we cannot do it all alone. Just as in the post-WWII era other manufacturing economies stood up and be¬gan to compete with American dominance, so too has American dominance in the cyber domain begun to erode as other nations with different skills and technology emerge as global leaders. MORE
|
August 22, 2023 — Christian Espinoza’s The Smartest Person in the Room provides a creative approach to understanding and improving company culture. While the book emphasizes improving highly technical employees’ communication and interpersonal skills, it ensures broad applicability through simplistic language and relatable personal anecdotes. The “Secure Methodology” lists in-detail human-centric goals for technical employees who experience challenges communicating with co-workers. Tailoring a technically-oriented methodology to advance social development makes Espinoza’s book a useful, thought-provoking read. MORE
|
August 22, 2023 — As revisionist powers seek to disrupt the international order and cyber threats to critical infrastructure persist, the Department of Defense (DoD) must effectively position its cyber forces and capabilities to defend against cyber-attacks before they hit the homeland. An attack against the US power grid could result in multiple failures in life-sustaining infrastructure and significantly impact Joint Force power-projection capabilities. U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) must work closely with U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) to orchestrate federal and non-federal stakeholders’ cyber authorities, capabilities, and equities to posture DoD cyber forces to respond with speed and agility. However, the myriad of federal cyber laws, regulations, authorities, and public and private sector stakeholder equities could impede DoD’s response efforts. National cybersecurity is “a team sport,” but players tend to use different playbooks or play by different rules. Tools such as a DoD “Complex Catastrophe Cyber Stakeholders, Communications, Authorities, and Narratives” (C3 SCAN) framework could enable USNORTHCOM and USCYBERCOM to foster collaboration, validate plans and orders, enumerate and prioritize mission-relevant terrain in cyberspace, and ensure readiness for Defense Support to Cyber Incident Response (DSCIR). MORE
|
August 22, 2023 — The need to understand cyber vulnerabilities and information in real time is imperative and often mission-critical in battlefield scenarios. As technologies continue to evolve, a need arises for more time-efficient and effective solutions within the cyber domain. With the growing popularity of synthetic environment technologies such as Augmented Reality (AR), Virtual Reality (VR), and Mixed Reality (MR) in a variety of fields, the question emerges: How can applications of this technology be applied to the field of cyber and what impact can they have? In this article, we survey the body of knowledge, both theoretical and empirical, of existing works exploring AR, VR, and MR technologies as solutions to common cyber challenges, as well as discuss the advances, gaps, and opportunities of this technology within the cyber domain. MORE
|
August 22, 2023 — This article provides an overview of updates to the Dyadic Cyber Incident and Campaign Dataset (DCID). Whereas most efforts to catalogue cyber incidents focus on curated lists and attack typologies, the DCID uses a standardized set of coding procedures consistent with best practices in social science. As a result, the analysis reveals there is a tendency to exaggerate the use and impact of cyber operations, obscuring their role as an instrument of disruption, espionage, and sabotage, and complements to larger coercive campaigns. The article outlines the construction of version 2.0, which documents rival, state-to-state use of cyber operations as an instrument of power. The expanded dataset introduces additional incidents based on various web-searching methods and human coder cross-validation while also adding new variables for ransomware, supply chain attacks, and connections to ongoing information operations. DCID 2.0 contains 429 incidents representing a critical attempt to scope the domain of conflict among strategic rivals. MORE
|