Defending Forward on the Korean Peninsula: Cyber Deterrence in the U.S.-ROK Alliance
By Dr. James E. Platte
| March 23, 2020
The United States has provided extended deterrence, backed by U.S. nuclear weapons, to South Korea since the end of the Korean War in 1953, and despite repeated low-level provocations by North Korea, the U.S.-ROK alliance has successfully deterred strategic attack on South Korea. The allies now face a growing asymmetric threat from North Korea in the cyber domain, and the alliance has yet to incorporate the cyber domain into the allied strategic deterrence posture. This paper examines cyber deterrence thinking and analyzes how to formulate a cyber deterrence posture as part of the overall strategic deterrence posture of the U.S.-ROK alliance. As with kinetic attacks, the alliance should focus on deterring cyber-attacks that produce cross-domain strategic effects and divide responsibilities to leverage each other’s capabilities and interests. Even for cyber-attacks that do not reach the threshold of producing strategic effects, U.S. Defense Department cyber concepts like “defending forward” and “persistent engagement” can be operationalized to reduce the threat to South Korea posed by the range of North Korea’s malicious cyber activity.
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