For much of the cyber era, policymakers and practitioners have debated whether the United States is winning or losing in cyberspace. This essay argues that this framing is increasingly outdated. Cyber capabilities are no longer a discrete instrument operating at the margins of conflict, but a foundational component of modern military power, strategic competition, and statecraft. The more relevant challenge is not whether the United States can achieve victory in cyberspace alone, but whether it can effectively integrate cyber capabilities into broader efforts to deter adversaries, shape strategic outcomes, strengthen resilience, and support military campaigns. The essay examines the limitations of a predominantly reactive and defense-oriented approach in an era of continuous competition, highlighting how adversaries employ cyber capabilities persistently to shape the strategic environment below the threshold of armed conflict. The author argues for a more proactive and integrated posture that combines offensive and defensive capabilities, leverages partnerships across government and industry, and incorporates cyber considerations into military planning from the outset. The ultimate measure of success is not winning individual cyber engagements, but leveraging cyber capabilities to help win the broader strategic competition and, when necessary, the wars of the future.
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doi.org/10.55682/cdr/5q87-9tr0
The Cyber Defense Review
Volume 11, Issue 2