This article examines the persistent question of whether cyberwar constitutes “war” and why this distinction matters for international stability and escalation dynamics. It argues that attempts to define cyberwar through fixed technical or quantitative criteria—such as scale, damage, or attribution—are ultimately insufficient, as the designation of cyber actions as “war” is inherently political and shaped by strategic interests. The analysis focuses on escalation, particularly the role of thresholds that distinguish escalation by degree from escalation by type, emphasizing how the classification of cyber operations influences whether responses cross into kinetic conflict. The author outlines three perspectives—consensus that cyberwar is war, consensus that it is not, and disagreement between actors—and argues that instability is greatest when perceptions diverge. It further explores the complicating role of cyberespionage, sanctions, and the ambiguous positioning of cyber operations within an “escalation lattice.” The article concludes that predictability in how states interpret and respond to cyber operations is essential to reducing miscalculation and unintended conflict, even if clear and universally accepted thresholds remain elusive.
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doi.org/10.55682/cdr/ahs0-k0pg
The Cyber Defense Review
Volume 11, Issue 2