This article examines what kind of military cyber force the United States requires and what organizing principles should guide future force posture and structure. It argues that cyberspace’s character as a domain of constant contact favors continuous, scalable campaigning rather than episodic operations. Using historical institutional analysis to survey U.S. service, functional, and geographic commands, the article derives criteria for evaluating organizational reform proposals. It foregrounds the core questions that should discipline ongoing debates: What problem, precisely, are advocates trying to solve? What do U.S. military cyber organizations need to do over the coming decades across competition, crisis, and armed conflict? How will proposed changes affect synergy versus segmentation between intelligence and operations, and between cyber and the wider Joint Force? Can adaptation occur with less disruption, expense, and risk while preserving service-organic capabilities and tight intelligence–operations integration? By centering these questions, the article offers a “form follows function” framework to judge whether disruptive organizational change would genuinely improve U.S. cyber campaigning effectiveness and long-term strategic advantage for the nation.
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