Cyberspace has been formally recognized as a domain of warfare for over two decades, yet U.S. military doctrine and practice continue to treat it primarily as a cross-domain enabler rather than a battlespace of independent operational and strategic consequence. This paper argues that the prevailing doctrinal framing—cyber as a support function within joint operations—has hindered the development of operational art, force generation models, and integrated campaign design for cyberspace. The paper critiques the conceptual conflation of cyberspace with the information environment and with electromagnetic warfare; it also bridges doctrine with recent scholarship on whether cyberspace constitutes an operational domain. It proposes the adoption of new doctrinal concepts, such as cyberspace control operations, as a foundation for differentiating cyberspace as battlespace rather than a supporting function. The paper highlights the risk of sustaining the supporting-role mindset in an era when adversaries, such as the PRC, employ cyberspace operations as primary tools for competition and deterrence. By clarifying the doctrinal vocabulary and contrasting U.S. practice with the approaches of its adversaries, this paper offers a framework for treating cyberspace as a true domain of warfighting in its own right.
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