Public debates over the creation of a separate Cyber Force service, along with directives to expand the role of U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM), raise an opportunity to examine the control of cyber operations in a high-intensity war between technological near-peers. Fighting such a war effectively would require high-speed decisions within a contested electromagnetic environment. Sensors, satellites, networks, and long-haul communications would be continuously under attack. In addition to electronic warfare, the use of anti-satellite weapons should be expected. Data transmission between forward operational units—particularly strike groups at sea—and the rear area headquarters of the Combatant Commands (COCOMs) would be, at best, narrow-band and intermittent. So would cyber support operations emanating from Ft. Meade, with USCYBERCOM-controlled operations confined to strategic-level attacks (and defense). Tactical units may be left to their own devices when integrating kinetic and non-kinetic operations against enemy forces. These possibilities argue for moving cyber warfare capabilities out to the tactical edge—to strike groups, Army divisions, Marine expeditionary units (MEU), and expeditionary air forces. There, they can be directly applied to engaging enemy combat networks and, especially, operational technology (OT)—perhaps the most vulnerable and least protected cyber-enabled systems. The article examines whether the current USCYBERCOM structure as an independent COCOM should be ‘decommissioned’ and its components ‘recommissioned’ under the command of the regional COCOMs, with the Cyber National Mission Force under either U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) or U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).
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